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͞the UK governmental body NICE (the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence)... 
has performed a signal service.  It has shown to the world that the wellbeing approach can 
become an acceptable basis for public ƉŽůŝĐǇ͘͟ 
Lord K ?ŽŶŶĞůů, head of the UK civil service, 2005-2011 
 ?K ?ŽŶŶĞůů et al., 2014) 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, we propose a practical measure of individual wellbeing to facilitate the economic 
evaluation of public policies.  We propose to evaluate policies in terms of years of good life gained, 
in a way that complements and generalises conventional cost-benefit analysis in terms of money.  
We aim to show how years of good life could be measured in practice by harnessing readily available 
data on three important elements of individual wellbeing: income, health-related quality of life, and 
longevity.  We also aim to identify the main ethical assumptions needed to use this measure. 
 
Our proposed measure is a straightforward extension of the  ‘quality adjusted life year ? (QALY) 
measure of individual health used in health economics (Cookson and Culyer, 2010).  Instead of 
measuring years of healthy life  W the health QALY  W we propose to measure years of good life  W the 
wellbeing QALY.1  The basic idea is the same: to measure years of life, adjusted for quality of life.  
The difference is just that we propose adjusting for aspects of quality of life related not only to 
health but also to income and the consumption of goods and services.  We use a broad definition of 
 ‘income ? that includes not only all sources of financial income after taxes  W for example, from 
employment, financial assets and cash benefits  W but also the imputed financial value of nonmarket 
goods and services provided or subsidised by the state  W such as health, education and local public 
amenities  W and by the family and others  W such as housing, cooking and informal care.2   
 
The wellbeing QALY is a practical tool that can be implemented in different ways and does not 
commit the user to any particular philosophical theory about the nature of individual wellbeing.  For 
example, the wellbeing QALY could be interpreted either as an indicator of realised wellbeing or as 
an indicator of opportunity to realise wellbeing, insofar as income, health and longevity are all 
central ingredients both in ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ actual achieved level of flourishing and also in their ability to 
achieve different levels of flourishing.3  In other words, the wellbeing QALY indicates rather than 
constitutes wellbeing. 
 
The most obvious application of our approach is to public health policies which are explicitly and 
primarily designed to impact on ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ income, health and longevity, such as sales taxes on 
tobacco, alcohol and sugar.  Such policies can be evaluated by combining epidemiological models of 
morbidity and mortality over the life course with economic models of supply and demand for the 
product under consideration.  Models of this kind have been used by the UK government to evaluate 
alcohol minimum pricing proposals in England, allowing for differential impacts by age, gender, 
alcohol risk group and income group (Meier et al., 2016, Holmes et al., 2014).  Once a combined 
                                                 
1
 Some authorƐƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘wellbeing adjusted life year ? (WELBY).  We have no strong views on 
terminology, other than seeking to avoid an acronym with off-putting connotations such as WALY. 
2
 ĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ‘consumption ? as the market value of the goods and services they use in a 
given time period.  This can differ from  ‘income ?, since income can be saved or given away rather than consumed, and 
ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĚďǇďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐŽƌƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŽĨǁĞĂůƚŚ ?tĞĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂƐƚƌŽŶŐǀŝĞǁŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ
to focus in practice on income or consumption, for two reasons.  First, in practice income is often used as a proxy for 
consumption.  Second, income and wealth can enhance wellbeing by providing financial security, even if it is not actually 
used to pay for goods and services  W indeed, arguably, financial security can be thought of as a form of beneficial 
consumption. 
3
 /ƚĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐŵĂƌƚǇĂ^ĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘capability approach ? in the context of economic evaluation 
 W although this interpretation is controversial as different scholars interpret the capability approach in different ways.  
COOKSON, R. 2005. QALYs and the capability approach. Health Economics, 14, 817-829. 
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epidemiological-economic model of this kind has been built, it is then a fairly straightforward matter 
to take the outputs  W income, health and longevity impacts by social subgroups  W and convert them 
into wellbeing QALYs. 
 
Our approach can also be applied to public policies which are not primarily designed to impact upon 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ income, health and longevity  W including policies on social care, education, transport, social 
protection and so on.  These policies are currently evaluated using conventional cost-benefit 
analysis, based on a diverse range of policy outcome metrics converted into monetary values, 
usually without any underpinning economic-epidemiological model of impacts on income, health 
and longevity.  Our approach can be used to complement conventional cost-benefit analysis by 
translating monetary benefits into years of good life gained.  Any measure of policy outcome can be 
given a monetary value based on ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ willingness to pay for improved outcomes.  Our proposal 
is then to convert those monetary benefits into years of good life gained, using data on the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ existing level of income and health and explicit normative assumptions about the rate of 
conversion from additional income into additional wellbeing. 
 
KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ǁŝĚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽĨƚĞŶĚŽŚĂǀĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛincome, health and 
longevity, even if those impacts are not the primary policy objectives.  For example, improvements 
in ĂĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛeducational outcomes and family stability can have important long-term impacts on their 
life chances  W including their earnings, health and mortality risk later in life.  So ideally our approach 
would be applied to wider public policies in two stages.  First, the construction of a lifecourse 
economic-epidemiological model to estimate lifetime impacts on income, health and mortality.  
Second, the incorporation of wider outcomes relating to wider dimensions of wellbeing by 
converting them into consumption equivalent values.  The  ‘full ? income benefits  W including the 
monetary value of wider outcomes  W can then be combined with the health and longevity benefits to 
estimate years of good life gained. 
 
An alternative way of implementing the concept of years of good life gained was recently proposed 
by the  ‘Commission on Wellbeing and Policy ?, chaired by a former head of the UK civil service, Lord 
K ?ŽŶŶĞůů  ?K ?ŽŶŶĞůů et al., 2014). K ?ŽŶŶĞůů and colleagues propose to adjust for quality of life 
directly using data on subjective wellbeing or life satisfaction, whereas we propose to adjust for 
quality of life indirectly using more readily available and arguably more informative data on income 
and (multiple dimensions of) health quality.  The other leading alternative to conventional cost-
benefit analysis is the  ‘equivalent income ? approach (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2013, Fleurbaey et 
al., 2013), which we return to in the discussion section.
Years of good life based on income and health  1 
 
What is wrong with conventional cost-benefit analysis? 
In conventional cost-benefit analysis, non-monetary outcomes are given a monetary value based on 
how much people are willing to pay for them.  These monetary amounts are then simply added up.  
Various methods have been proposed for adjusting or  ‘distributionally weighting ? the monetary 
benefits before adding them up, but these are rarely used in practice.  This conventional approach, 
which we shall refer to as  ‘unweighted cost-benefit analysis ?, has two major limitations.  First, it 
makes no allowance for variation between individuals in the conversion rate from income to 
wellbeing  W i.e. the marginal utility of income.  Second, it provides no information about the social 
distribution of costs and benefits and the resulting impacts of policies on social inequalities.  Public 
polices and institutions often have important distributional equity objectives relating to the 
reduction of social inequalities.  Decision makers are thus interested to know whether policy options 
are likely to increase or reduce social inequalities, and by how much. 
 
The fundamental problem with the conventional approach is that it fails to measure wellbeing 
impacts accurately.  There is substantial variation between people in how far changes in income 
impact upon their wellbeing.  Two particularly important sources of variation are that (1) an extra 
dollar does more to improve the wellbeing of a poor person than a rich person, and (2) an extra 
dollar is no use to anyone after their death.  To take an extreme example, consider elderly billionaire 
Adam with end-stage cancer and young pauper Bob with a painful and disfiguring skin disease that 
renders him unable to work, socialise or enjoy physical intimacy.  Bob is not able to pay one dollar 
for an extra fifty years of healthy life free of skin disease.  By contrast, Adam is willing to pay a billion 
dollars for an extra three months of life undergoing debilitating chemotherapy.  This is not because 
he or anyone else thinks these extra three months of life will be wonderful.  Rather, it is because he 
is extremely rich, cannot take the money with him, and does not want to give the money away.  
Unweighted cost-benefit analysis values both treatments at something approaching the respective 
willingness to pay of both individuals, though somewhat less due to the administrative costs and 
 ‘deadweight ? losses of raising new public funds through taxation.  It therefore implies that the 
government should be willing to spend something approaching a billion dollars of public money for 
ĚĂŵ ?s extra three months of unhealthy life, but should not be willing to spend a dollar giving Bob a 
healthy life for the next fifty years.  When applied in a thoroughgoing manner, therefore, valuing 
policies in terms of ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ willingness to pay may not accurately reflect strength of preference and 
can have ethically and politically unacceptable implications. This is not quite so stark in practice 
because instead of looking at each ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ willingness to pay, a substantial amount of averaging 
takes place. However, this averaging is an ad hoc move that is not justified by the underlying theory 
and only partly alleviates the problems. 
 
We propose the wellbeing QALY as a practical way of addressing these limitations.  Our proposal can 
be seen as a practical application of the theoretical frameworks for economic evaluation developed 
by Broome (Broome, 1991, Broome, 2004) and Adler (Adler, 2012).  A key feature of these 
frameworks is that they are based on a set of explicit value judgements, some of which are 
formulated mathematically in the form of a  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů welfare ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?.  This contrasts with what we 
might call the  ‘Paretian ? philosophy of welfare economics underpinning unweighted cost-benefit 
analysis, as advocated in health economics for example by Pauly (Pauly, 1996, Pauly, 1995). 
 
The Paretian approach seeks to minimise the need for explicit value judgements.  Of course, when 
making normative claims it is never possible to avoid value judgements altogether.  For example, the 
Paretian approach makes a value judgement about the nature of wellbeing (i.e. that wellbeing 
consists in preferences, rather than experienced happiness or objective goods) and about the 
comparison of social states (i.e. that state A is a  ‘Pareto improvement ? compared with state B if at 
least one person prefers A and no-one prefers B).  In practice, it makes a substantially more 
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controversial value judgement based on the idea of a  ‘potential ? Pareto improvement.  The idea is 
that a policy change is worthwhile if the winners (in the example above, Adam the billionaire) can 
hypothetically compensate the losers (Bob, the pauper) so that everyone is better off.  This is 
controversial, because the compensation is not actually paid in practice and often cannot be paid 
even in theory due to imperfect information, transaction costs and other market imperfections 
(Blackorby and Donaldson, 1990).  This means that the Paretian approach systematically prioritises 
improvements to the wellbeing of the wealthy over improvements to the wellbeing of the poor, in 
rough proportion to difference in ability to pay  ?  something that conflicts with most ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?s 
intuitive value judgments. 
 
The Paretian approach can be contrasted with what we might call the  ‘social choice ? philosophy of 
welfare economics (Adler and Fleurbaey, 2016), as advocated for example by Atkinson (Atkinson, 
2011, Atkinson, 2009), Sen (Sen, 1999) and Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 
2013) and in health economics by Williams (Williams, 1972) and Culyer (Cookson and Claxton, 2012).  
The  ‘social choice ? approach seeks to make explicit value judgements about social objectives, and to 
subject those value judgements to public scrutiny and deliberation.  For example, Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert write that:  “tŚĞŶ one aims at policy evaluation, it is better to make the underlying value 
judgments as open as possible.  Having an informed debate about such value judgments in a formal 
model has always been the main objective of social choice ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?(Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 
2013).  The idea is that economic evaluation aims to provide social decision makers and stakeholders 
with useful information about how far alternative decision options are likely to achieve their 
objectives.  The appropriate set of value judgements and policy objectives is ultimately a matter for 
the legitimate social decision maker to specify.  However, alternative sets of value judgements can 
be explored in sensitivity analysis to help decision makers and stakeholders think through the 
implications of policies in a deliberative decision making process.  In this way, economic evaluation 
using a  ‘social choice ? approach can be seen as a contribution towards democracy in the broad sense 
of  ‘the exercise of public reason ? (Sen, 2003, Sen, 2011). 
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Measuring individual wellbeing 
We can distinguish  ‘period-specific wellbeing ? during a specific time period from  ‘lifetime wellbeing ? 
over the entire lifecourse. Lifetime wellbeing is generally what social decision makers ultimately care 
about, but it is harder to measure than period-specific wellbeing. We propose to treat lifetime 
wellbeing as the sum total of period-specific wellbeing over the ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ lifetime.  This 
assumption of additive separability of wellbeing over time is standard practice in economics and 
agrees with some theories of lifetime wellbeing in the philosophical literature (Broome, 2004). 
 
We propose measuring period-specific wellbeing as the time spent alive during that period, adjusted 
for overall quality of life during that period. We estimate quality of life during the period as a 
function of both health and income during that period. For convenience, we use one year as the 
standard time period.  The choice of period does raise issues of value judgement, however, since 
additive separability over time becomes less plausible over short periods of time.  For example, 
imagine time periods were measured in minutes.  Straight after consuming a hearty meal, your 
wellbeing is likely to depend more on consumption in the previous few minutes, and perhaps on 
anticipated consumption later in the day, than on consumption in the current minute.  This kind of 
issue is less problematic when consumption is measured over a year, or perhaps even over a month.  
However, parallel arguments can of course be made that there may be  ‘spillovers ? in wellbeing 
effects from one year to another and that the pattern of wellbeing over a lifetime matters. 
 
We propose to anchor the wellbeing QALY at 0 and 1 in a way that makes it compatible with the 
health QALY, and allows us to interpret 1 as a year of good life.  It is desirable that our wellbeing 
QALY numbers agree with the data used to produce the health QALY weightings, for the people who 
were the source of these data, at least as far as agreeing whether a given health state is better or 
worse than death.  More specifically, we propose that a score of 1 represents a year of life that is 
lived in full health while enjoying the high living standards  W by global historical standards  W of the 
average person in a modern high income country.  And a score of 0 represents a year of life in a 
severely ill state of health that the average person considers to be  ‘no better than death, given their 
current (average) level of income.4  This aligns the scale with the health QALY scale, and facilitates 
the use of existing data on health-related quality of life in the construction of the wellbeing QALY.   
 
We do not propose bounding the scale at 0 and 1, however.  This means that values below 0 and 
above 1 are allowed, reflecting the possibility of states of health that are worse than death, and 
states of income that are better than the standard level of income in a high income country.  We say 
more below about how both  ‘good quality life ? and  ‘life barely worth living ? might be defined and 
measured.  In line with our  ‘social decision making ? philosophy, these definitions are value 
judgements about the appropriate objective of social policy, and are ultimately a matter for the 
legitimate social decision maker to specify. 
  
So far, everything is almost exactly the same as the health QALY in mathematical terms  W except that 
we have re-interpreted period-specific quality of life as  ‘overall quality of life ? rather than  ‘health-
related quality of life ?, and have allowed scores greater than one.  The key innovation is that we now 
propose to measure period-specific quality of life as a function of income as well as health. 
 
In reality, of course, quality of life depends on a lot more than just income and health.  But we are 
simplifying for practical purposes, since income and health are two important components of quality 
of life that are influenced by public policy, that are of substantial concern to policy makers, and that 
are readily measurable.  Our proposal allows other important public policy outcomes, such as 
education outcomes, crime outcomes, and so on, to be valued in two ways.  First, indirectly, via long-
                                                 
4
 An alternative would be to set 0 as a combination of this severely ill state of health along with a minimal level of income.   
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term impacts on the ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ income and health over the lifecourse.  Second, directly by 
monetising these outcomes using willingness to pay, just as in traditional cost-benefit analysis, and 
then converting the corresponding monetary benefits into years of good life gained. 
 
Although our two-dimensional approach to measuring period-specific wellbeing may seem simple, it 
is more demanding in terms of data requirements than unweighted cost-benefit analysis as 
commonly practiced.  This is because to estimate wellbeing impacts we need to know not only the 
 ‘average ? effects on income and health for the  ‘average ? person, but also (1) the distribution of 
baseline income and health between different social groups, and (2) the distribution of effects on 
income and health between different groups and over the whole lifetime of the individual.  In 
theory, unweighted cost-benefit analysis does also need to allow for both (1) and (2), since 
willingness to pay will depend on baseline income and health.  In practice, however, this is almost 
never done  W instead, analysts simply work with averages. 
 
Mathematically, we can specify an individual lifetime wellbeing function as follows: 
 
  (1) 
 
where  
 
wi is the lifetime wellbeing of individual i  
wit is the period-specific wellbeing or quality of life or individual i 
cit is the income (or consumption) of individual i in period t 
hit is the health quality of individual i in period t.  
 
Income can be measured in real financial resources  W such as dollars in a given year.  Health quality5 
hit is a function h(Hit) of Hit, a multi-dimensional vector of the health attributes of individual i in 
period t. Whereas Hit is highly multidimensional, hit is a scalar  W we assume it is measured on the 
standard scale of the health QALY, bounded above at 1, where 1 represents full health and 0 
represents death or a health state as bad as death.  A key assumption here is that the interaction 
between health states and income operates only through health quality, such that wellbeing only 
depends on health quality and income and not also upon the pattern of underlying multidimensional 
health states.  This assumption might be violated, for example, if mental and physical dimensions of 
health interact with income in different ways to produce wellbeing.  For example, a person with 
depression might have the same quality of health score as a person with severe osteoarthritis, but 
their wellbeing may be less sensitive to income if their depressed state of mind prevents them 
enjoying the consumption of goods and services. 
 
The period-specific wellbeing function wit(cit, hit) is monotonically increasing in both variables. To 
measure this empirically, however, some further specification is necessary. 
 
One possibility is the following simple additive wellbeing function, decomposing wellbeing into the 
utility of health and the utility of income: 
 ݓ௜௧ ൌ ݄௜௧ ൅ ݑሺܿ௜௧ሻ    (2) 
 
                                                 
5
 We use the phrase  ‘health quality ? to emphasise that this is not a  ‘value-free ? physical quantity of health, but rather is a 
value-laden index of health-related quality of life that requires value judgements both in selecting and describing the 
relevant dimensions of health and in combining measurements of the different health dimensions to generate an overall 
score.  We do not take sides in the philosophical debate about whether this number is more appropriately referred to as 
 ‘health ? or as  ‘the value of health ?. 
),(¦ 
t
ititi hcww
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u(cit) is a standard isoelastic utility of income function defined as follows: 
 ݑሺܿ௜௧ሻ ൌ ܣ െ ܤ ൈ ሺܿ௜௧ሻଵିఎ  (3)  
 
A and B are normalisation constants defined as follows in order to anchor the scale appropriately at 
0 and 1: 
 
A = Cmin
(1  W ɻ ? / (Cmin(1  W ɻ ? - Cstd(1  W ɻ ?) 
 
B = 1 / (Cmin
(1  W ɻ ? - Cstd(1  W ɻ ?) 
 
x ɻ >1  ? “ĞƚĂ ? ?is a normative parameter representing the diminishing marginal value of 
income 
x cmin is minimal consumption, defined as the lowest possible level of income at which life 
is considered worth living for an individual in full health.  
x cstd is standard income, defined as the income of the average individual in a modern 
high income country 
 
The higher the eta parameter, ɻ, the more rapidly diminishing returns set in as consumption 
increases.  The theoretical literature on isoelastic functions supports the possibility that ɻ  A? 1, in 
which case the wellbeing function is not bounded above.  However, the empirical literature supports 
values of ɻ of at least 1.  Based on a study of the association between subjective wellbeing and 
consumption by Layard and colleagues, using four large cross-sectional surveys of subjective 
happiness and two panel surveys from multiple countries between 1972 and 2005 one reasonable 
assumption might be eta equals 1.26 (Layard et al., 2008).   
 
Our proposal is to set minimal income around the level of subsistence income.  For example, one 
might start with the World Bank ?Ɛ current absolute global poverty line of $1.90 a day in 2011 prices 
(updating the previous line of $1.25 a day in 2005 prices), corresponding to $693.50 per year in 2011 
prices6.  Since we normally think that healthy lives in extreme poverty are worth living, we think cmin 
should be below this level. So in the example below we use a value of cmin = $300 per year, which is a 
little under half the World Bank poverty line.  
 
For Cstd, we use a value of $30,000 US dollars for the USA in 2014, based on the following calculation.  
In 2014, US median household income before taxes and benefits was $53,657, average household 
size was 2.6 and 23% of the population were children (aged 0 to 17).7  We can thus think of the 
average household as comprising 2 adults and 0.6 of a child.  To allow for household size and 
composition, the standard equivalence scale used in the US for this kind of household is (adults + 
0.5*children)0.7 which yields a scale of 1.798.  Dividing household income by 1.79 then gives us a 
figure of $29,951 for individual income, which we round up to $30,000.   
 
We use this figure for convenience, as ideally one would want a figure after taxes and benefits and 
including the value of  ‘in kind ? benefits and services from the state and family.  This figure is not an 
unreasonable starting point, however, insofar as the taxes paid to the state by the typical household 
can be assumed approximately equal in value to the cash and noncash benefits received from the 
                                                 
6
 See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/10/25114899/global-count-extreme-poor-2012-data-issues-
methodology-initial-results 
7
 Data sources: (1) http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf 
(2) https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf 
(3) http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/tables/pop2.asp?popup=true; all accessed 17 May 2016. 
8
 Source of equivalence scale https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-251.pdf; 
accessed 17 May 2016. 
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state.  It will nevertheless underestimate the broad concept of individual income that we would 
ideally wish to measure, since it excludes the value of informal household services such as cooking, 
cleaning, childcare and so on. 
 
Figure 1 shows what the resulting relationship between period-specific wellbeing and consumption 
for someone in full health would look like, under these parameter assumptions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Wellbeing value of income in full health ;ɻ = 1.26) 
Note:  Income is shown on a log scale, and represents annual individual income after tax from all sources, including the 
imputed value of non-market services provided by state and family. 
 
We do not show wellbeing scores for consumption below subsistence income, since by definition 
individual income cannot fall below the subsistence level for long periods of time. Subsistence 
income is well below the minimal level of income that a modern high income country government 
would consider acceptable for its poorest citizen.  This is because the market price of basic food and 
shelter is substantially more than $1 a day in any high income country location, and our concept of 
income includes the imputed market value of goods and services provided free by the state, family 
and others.  So living on subsistence income would require avoiding offers of food and shelter from 
the state, family or others.  It would require living like a lone wild animal: sleeping rough, foraging 
for food, and avoiding almost all social contact. 
 
An alternative assumption would be to set Cmin around the minimal level of income considered 
acceptable for the poorest citizen in a high income country, for example the income of an 
unemployed adult with no private wealth who relies entirely on benefits and services provided by 
the state.  To illustrate the implications of this alternative assumption, Figure 2 below explores the 
value of Cmin = $10,000 per year.  This assumption implies that human life is barely worth living as 
 ?A?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ
ŝŶĐŽŵĞ 
 ?h^ŵĞĚŝĂŶ ? 
 ?A?ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ
ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?ŚĂůĨtŽƌůĚ
ĂŶŬƉŽǀĞƌƚǇůŝŶĞ ? 
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the poorest citizen in a high income country.  By contrast, the subsistence income approach implies 
that human life is barely worth living as a lone wild animal. 
 
 
Figure 2: Wellbeing under alternative assumptions about minimal income ;ɻ = 1.26) 
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Allowing for interactions between income and health 
The simple additive wellbeing function assumes the marginal benefit of consumption does not 
depend on ill health (Bleichrodt and Quiggin, 1999, Smith and Keeney, 2005, Hammitt, 2013).  An 
alternative view might be that the marginal benefit of consumption increases with ill health.  For 
example, additional income may bring substantial benefits to someone unable to walk, in allowing 
them to purchase mobility equipment and a variety of transport, communication and personal care 
services.  Yet another view might be that the marginal benefit of consumption decreases with ill 
health.  For example, additional income may bring limited benefits to someone who is severely 
depressed and no longer able to enjoy the good things in life. 
 
To allow for these possibilities, a more general wellbeing function would have the following form, 
based on a weighted average of additive and multiplicative functional forms: 
 ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙǤ ݄௜௧ Ǥ ݑሺܿ௜௧ሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻ൫݄௜௧ ൅ ݑሺܿ௜௧ሻ൯ െ  ?   (4) 
 
where 
x u(cit) is the wellbeing of consumption in full health.  
x ɲ is a consumption-health interaction parameter, bounded above by 1 to ensure that 
the marginal utility of consumption is always positive. 
 
When ɲ = 0, this reduces to the additive form in equation (3).  When ɲ > 0 the marginal benefit of 
consumption decreases with ill health, so that health and consumption function like economic 
complements.  When ɲ < 0 the marginal benefit of consumption increases with ill health, so that 
health and consumption function like economic substitutes.  This form is uniquely determined by the 
assumptions that: (i) the gambles people would accept over consumption levels are independent of 
quality of health state; (ii) the gambles people would accept over health states excluding death are 
independent of consumption level; and the boundary conditions (iii) if u(c)=h=1 then w = 1; (iv) if 
u(c)=1, h=0, then w = 0; and (v) if u(c)=0, h=1, then w = 0.  There is not much empirical evidence 
about this issue (Evans and Viscusi, 1991, Rey and Rochet, 2004), but one study suggested a positive 
value (Viscusi and Evans, 1990) whereas a more recent study supports a negative value of alpha of 
around -1 (Tengstam, 2014). 
 
In practice, we would therefore propose using a base case assumption of alpha = 0, for convenience 
and simplicity, and then sensitivity analysis around alternative plausible values such as alpha = 0.5 (in 
the middle of the possible range up to 1) and alpha = -1. 
 
Figure 3 shows how wellbeing changes with different levels of health under different assumptions 
about alpha, returning to our base case assumption that minimal income is subsistence income.9 The 
lowest health quality score in figure 3 is -0.281, reflecting the lowest score from the latest EQ-5D-5L 
health value set for England (Devlin et al., 2016). 
                                                 
9
 A web-based application for drawing further graphs of this kind based on different parameter values is available here 
https://miqdadasaria.shinyapps.io/wellbeing_adjusted_life_years/ 
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Figure 3: Wellbeing as a function of income and health with different values of alpha ;ɻ = 1.26 and Cmin = 300) 
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Measuring population average lifetime wellbeing 
To compare the outcomes of alternative social policies, we need to aggregate individual wellbeing 
outcomes to the population level.  The simplest way of doing this is just to take the average of individual 
wellbeing outcomes  W i.e. to calculate average lifetime wellbeing.  As is standard practice in economic 
evaluation, we assume that the population is stable and set aside the thorny issue of how to value 
population change. 
 
Our proposal allows average lifetime wellbeing to be measured on a ratio scale, in the same way that 
consumption can be measured on a ratio scale.  Unlike an interval scale (e.g. degrees Fahrenheit), a ratio 
scale has an absolute zero and so it makes sense to calculate ratios and percentage differences.  As well 
as being useful for economic evaluation, this is also useful for measuring social progress, since a ratio 
scale allows the calculation of percentage changes in a ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ average lifetime wellbeing over time, 
and percentage differences in average lifetime wellbeing between different societies.  Not all measures 
of social progress allow this.  For example, the concept of  ‘full national income ? augments standard 
measures of change in national income by adding in the monetary value of changes in population health 
over time (Jamison et al., 2013) (see, in particular, supplementary web appendix 3 
http://globalhealth2035.org/report/supplementary-web-appendices).  Unfortunately, however, this 
only allows one to calculate changes in full national income over time, not baseline levels of full national 
income.  So unlike wellbeing QALYs, the concept of  ‘full national income ? does not allow comparison of 
percentage changes over time or percentage differences between societies. 
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Measuring social inequality in lifetime wellbeing 
Our approach to measuring lifetime wellbeing already embodies one important type of concern for 
social inequality.  The wellbeing QALY embodies an assumption of diminishing marginal value of 
consumption.  It thus embodies the same form of concern for inequality in consumption as classical 
utilitarianism.  The utilitarian case for redistribution is that a dollar of consumption is worth less to a rich 
person than a poor person  W hence, other things equal, taking a dollar from a rich person and giving it to 
a poor person will tend to increase sum total wellbeing. 
 
However, policymakers may have additional concerns for social inequality in lifetime wellbeing, as well 
as inequality in current consumption.  Our wellbeing QALY metric is well suited to analysing such 
concerns, for three reasons.  First conducting separate analyses of inequality in different components of 
wellbeing  W e.g. inequality in consumption and inequality in health  W may be misleading, insofar as 
different components of wellbeing can compensate for one another (Adler, 2012, Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert, 2009).  Second, a ratio scale measure of individual lifetime wellbeing allows the use of 
standard indices of relative inequality based on percentage differences between individuals.  Third, the 
wellbeing QALY is well suited to analysing trade-offs between  ‘efficiency ? in terms of average wellbeing 
versus  ‘equity ? in terms of reducing inequality in the social distribution of lifetime wellbeing.  The 
wellbeing QALY metric allows the use of standard social welfare functions to analyse equity-efficiency 
trade-offs of this kind.  Standard social welfare functions can be expressed in the following abbreviated 
or reduced form (Adler, 2012): 
 ܹ ൌ ݓഥ כ ሺ ? െ ܫሺ࢝ǡ ߝሻሻ 
 
where  
W is social welfare 
w is a vector of the individual lifetime wellbeing of all individuals or groups in society ݓഥ  is mean individual lifetime wellbeing across the whole population 
I(.) is an inequality index scaled from 0 to 1 (where 0 is full equality and 1 full inequality) 
ɸ is an inequality aversion parameter 
 
One plausible functional form for the inequality index is the Atkinson function (Adler, 2012) (see Chapter 
5).  In the Atkinson function, ɸA? 0 represents zero aversion to inequality in which case I = 0.  Higher 
values of ɸ imply greater weight to the worse off i.e. those with lower lifetime wellbeing.  Finally, an 
infinite value of ɸ implies exclusive priority to the worst off individual or group  W i.e. a  ‘maximin ? 
principle.  Once ɸ has been specified, it is then possible to compare populations and policies in terms of 
overall social wellbeing, and to analyse trade-offs between changes in average lifetime wellbeing, ݓഥ , 
and changes in inequality, I.   
 
An extension of this approach is to adjust the vector of lifetime wellbeing as appropriate to focus on 
 ‘unfair ? determinants of individual wellbeing (e.g. parental class or race) and to set aside  ‘fair ? 
determinants (e.g. personal responsibility) and determinants that are neither  ‘fair ? nor  ‘unfair ? (e.g. 
misfortunes considered a matter of personal tragedy rather than social injustice) (Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert, 2009, Adler, 2012, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011, Asada et al., 2015, Ferriera and 
Peragine, 2016) (see Chapter 8 of Adler). 
 
Analysing inequality in lifetime wellbeing QALYs does not preclude performing additional forms of 
distributional analysis.  Decision makers may still want to have information about dimension-specific 
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inequality in consumption, for example if they have non-utilitarian concerns about inequality in 
consumption.  And they may want information about dimension-specific inequality in health if they have 
special concerns for inequality in health.  For example, in 1997, the then UK Secretary of State for Health 
Frank Dobson said that  “,ĞĂůƚŚ inequality is the worst inequality of all.  There is no more serious 
inequality than knowing that you'll die sooner because you're badly off." (http://www.lgcplus.com/govt-
takes-action-to-reduce-health-inequalities/1494985.article).  Our framework complements dimension-
specific analyses of this kind, by analysing interactions between consumption, health and wellbeing and 
placing the analysis within a more general framework. 
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Discussion 
We have proposed a practical way of evaluating public policies by combining data on consumption, 
health and longevity to measure years of good life.  The  ‘wellbeing QALY ? could in principle be used in 
any type of economic evaluation, including both cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis.  
Cost-effectiveness analysis using wellbeing QALYs would assume an exogenously fixed public budget  W 
i.e. no scope for raising taxes or finding other new sources of public finance.  It would then compare 
social policies on the basis of which way of spending that fixed budget yields the most years of good life.  
Cost-benefit analysis would go beyond this by allowing the possibility of raising taxes and changing the 
public budget  W and it would value those taxation costs, along with all other costs and benefits, in terms 
of their impacts on years of good life.  Either way, it would be important to know where the opportunity 
costs of social policies fall  W for example, which public budget(s) will be used to finance the policy.  This 
is because different sources of funding will have different implications for who bears the opportunity 
costs of the policy in terms of reduced income (including reductions in  ‘in kind ? consumption of public 
services)  W and hence the impact on years of good life. 
 
The attractive features of our approach are: 
 
1. It builds on well-understood concepts, data and methods already extensively used to 
inform decision making in the health sector 
2. It uses a simple, intuitive metric  W years of good life 
3. It requires only readily available data on income, health and longevity 
4. It facilitates clarity about policy objectives and value judgements  
5. It allows decision makers to explore the implications of alternative policy objectives and 
value judgements  
6. It allows analysis of percentage changes and equity-efficiency trade-offs 
 
The main disadvantages of our approach compared with conventional unweighted cost-benefit analysis 
are: 
 
1. It has more demanding requirements for explicit modelling of income and health 
distributions 
2. It has more demanding requirements for explicit social value judgement 
 
Our approach requires explicit modelling of distributions of income and health by population sub-group 
over the life course, as well as average effects on income and health.  Although more demanding in 
terms of data and assumptions, this kind of modelling is becoming ever more feasible in the age of  ‘big 
data ? (Layard et al., 2014, Wolfson, 1995, Wolfson and Rowe, 2013, Wolfson and Rowe, 2014).  
Furthermore, a thoroughgoing application of conventional cost-benefit analysis would also require 
modelling of these distributions, since willingness to pay depends on baseline income and health.  It is 
just that in practice this explicit modelling is rarely if ever done  W instead, the analysis relies upon 
implicit factual assumptions. 
 
In terms of social value judgement, the simplest implementation of our approach requires explicit 
specification of three new normative parameters: 
 
1. Diminishing marginal value of income, ʄ 
2. Minimal income, cmin 
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3. Standard income, cstd 
 
These three parameters specify how much wellbeing is derived from any given level of income.  The first 
specifies the degree of curvature in the curvilinear relationship between income and wellbeing, the 
second specifies where it crosses the horizontal axis at zero wellbeing, and the third specifies the level of 
income in full health that is considered to represent a year of good life.  Taken together, these 
parameters tell us how much change in wellbeing is derived from a one dollar change in income, and 
how this varies for people with different baseline levels of income. 
 
A fuller implementation of our approach requires two further normative parameters: 
 
4. Income-health interaction, ɲ  
5. Inequality aversion, ɸ 
 
 The fourth parameter, ɲ, allows for interactions between health and income in determining wellbeing.  
And finally, the inequality aversion parameter, ɸ ? allows the analysis to incorporate the value of reducing 
inequality in lifetime wellbeing as well as the value of increasing sum total lifetime wellbeing. 
 
Like other normative parameters in economic evaluation  W such as the appropriate discount rate for 
benefits accruing to future generations, or the monetary value of a life year  W these parameters are 
ultimately a matter for value judgement by the relevant social decision maker(s), after a due process of 
public deliberation.  However, to help guide this process of deliberation, empirical  ‘benchmarks ? can be 
found for all five parameters  W for example using data on life satisfaction for 1 and 4, data on average 
and subsistence levels of income for 2 and 3, and data on public views for 5.  Furthermore, the 
implications of different value judgements on all five parameters can be explored in sensitivity analysis. 
 
The leading alternative to the  ‘years of good life ? approach is the  ‘equivalent income ? approach 
(Fleurbaey et al., 2013).  This approach retains money as the metric of value, but uses a system of 
distributional weights to adjust raw willingness to pay amounts.  The distributional weights are based 
upon (1) a normative inequality aversion parameter, and (2) a preference-based measure of equivalent 
income, defined as the level of income in full health and at a reference level of other dimensions of 
wellbeing that the individual considers equally as good as their current level of income, health and other 
dimensions of wellbeing.  Equivalent income can be estimated, for example, through a survey exercise 
asking people their willingness to pay for full health.  This approach has similarly demanding 
distributional modelling requirements to the wellbeing QALY approach.  The main advantage of the 
equivalent income approach is that it is more respectful of individual preferences.  Instead of making 
normative assumptions about the rate of conversion between income, health and wellbeing, it relies 
upon survey data on how much people are actually willing to pay for full health.  The main 
disadvantages are that distributionally-weighted willingness to pay figures (1) cannot be interpreted on 
a ratio scale, and (2) are somewhat unintuitive for policy makers  W it is not clear what a  ‘distributionally 
weighted ? dollar means.  Of course, there are similar risks with the concept of  ‘years of good life ?, which 
decision makers may initially find unintuitive.  However, experience in the health field has shown that 
decision makers are capable of understanding and using the QALY concept in practice, despite initial 
qualms.   
 
The wellbeing QALY approach could be adjusted in order to reflect individual preferences as closely as 
possible, however, by adjusting the normative parameters in line with empirical evidence about 
individual preferences regarding income and consumption.  However, there is a limit to how any 
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approach that imposes a coherent logical structure on social valuations can reflect individual 
preferences.  This is because cognitive psychologists and behavioural economists have amassed 
considerable evidence from both laboratory and field experiments that individual preferences are 
incoherent  W for example, individual willingness to pay is often influenced by apparently irrelevant 
factors such as  ‘priming ? and  ‘framing ? effects (Kahneman, 2011, Sugden, 2008). 
 
K ?ŽŶŶĞůů and colleagues have proposed a different way of operationalising the concept of years of 
good life, which we might call the life satisfaction QALY.  They propose to measure period-specific 
wellbeing directly, using data on life satisfaction, rather than indirectly using data on consumption and 
health.  Data on life satisfaction are collected in surveys, usually on a scale of 0 to 10, using questions 
like the following one from the 1970 British Cohort Study: 
 
 “,ĞƌĞ is a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that you are completely dissatisfied and '10' means that 
you are completely satisfied. Please enter the number which corresponds with how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you are with the way life has turned out so ĨĂƌ ? 
 
K ?ŽŶŶĞůů and colleagues propose taking this data, dividing by 10, and interpreting the resulting 0 to 1 
index as a ratio scale where 0 is a quality of life as bad as death and 1 is a fully satisfactory quality of life.  
An advantage of this approach is that it measures (subjective) wellbeing directly rather than relying on a 
modelled estimate based on other variables.  It thus avoids a limitation with our approach, which is that 
an ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ rate of conversion from income to wellbeing may depend on individual characteristics 
other than just income and health.  A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that the interpretation 
of life satisfaction data as a ratio scale is an ad hoc assumption that so far has not been subjected to 
psychometric testing  W in contrast to the huge literature on developing and testing ratio scale measures 
of health quality (Brazier, 2007). This assumption may work as an approximation, but there is little 
reason to think that the wellbeing difference between say 3 and 4 as a survey answer is the same as the 
difference between 7 and 8.  Another issue is that the research community has less experience using 
data on life satisfaction to measure policy impacts than data on income and health, and there are many 
potential biases around issues such as expectations and adaptation that have not yet been fully explored 
in the context of policy evaluation (Fujita and Diener, 2005, Lucas, 2007, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006).  
A final disadvantage is that data on income and health outcomes are more frequently collected at 
present than data on the effects of interventions on subjective wellbeing. 
 
Table 1: Key features of the three leading alternatives to conventional cost-benefit analysis 
Approach Main normative 
data sources 
Main normative parameters Metric Respects 
preferences? 
Ratio 
scale? 
Wellbeing 
QALY 
Income, health Elasticity of marginal utility 
of income, standard income, 
minimal income 
Years of good life No Yes 
Life 
satisfaction 
QALY 
Life satisfaction None  W though embodies 
normative assumptions in 
treating ordinal data as a 
ratio scale 
Years of good life No Yes 
Equivalent 
income 
Willingness to pay 
for full health 
Inequality aversion Distributionally 
weighted money 
Yes No 
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Despite these differences, our proposal for wellbeing QALYs, the K ?ŽŶŶĞůů proposal for life satisfaction 
QALYs, and the equivalent income approach all share a key similarity: they all require models of the 
long-term effects of policies on different dimensions of wellbeing for different types of individual.  A key 
next stage in research will therefore be to develop micro simulation models of wellbeing over the life 
course and use them to apply these three approaches alongside standard unweighted cost-benefit 
analysis.  
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